Chapter 1 of the thesis examines if, and how, Hayek's theory of cultural evolution can be compatible with the current literature in biological anthropology. In particular, Boyd and Richerson's "dual inheritance theory" highlights the importance of cultural group selection in social learning dynamics: frequency-dependent bias (i.e., conformist transmission and normative conformity), prestige bias transmission, and punishment are the social learning processes which allow for cultural group selection. Hayek, then, correctly predicted the importance of this evolutionary force in the emergence of social norms. However, we must be careful in addressing similarities and differences between the cultural and biological theories of evolution: any deterministic and teleological metaphor has to be avoided since natural selection is not the ultimate factor driving cultural evolution. The importance of imperfect perception is noted as a methodological tool typical of the cognitive evolutionary paradigm: human knowledge and transmission are error-prone.
Chapter 2 analyses the methodology of by cognitive evolutionary economics. I reject the orthodox version of methodological individualism in favour of a "sophisticated", "revolutionary", and "subjectivist" version of individualism. The debate on whether Hayek's theory of cultural evolution could be inconsistent with his individualistic methodology is misplaced. Cognitive evolutionary economics is compatible with the emergent properties of social facts and with the biological concept of altruism.
Chapter 3 defines the problem of knowledge coordination as an approach combining behavioural economics and philosophy of mind. When multiple stable equilibria are present in a pure coordination game, there is no player has any material interest to choose one equilibrium over the others. Scholars disagree about how coordination can occur under such circumstances. Two models of the mind known as theorytheory and simulation-theory are investigated as possible cognitive mechanisms involved in pure coordination games. Theory-theory posits that in understanding other people's behaviour subjects have a "folk psychology", a tacitly codified theory about how people feel, believe, and act. By contrast, simulation-theory posits that attributing mental states involves a simulation and imagination process characterized by "putting oneself in other people's shoes", without any codified theory. Rather than defend one model over the other, I argue that we should associate theory-theory with coordination characterized by non-derivative salience, and simulation-theory with viable mental processes in coordination games having derivative salience.
Finally, I describe an economic behavioural experiment that has been run at ALEX, the cognitive economics laboratory at the University of "Piemonte Orientale". This experiment consists of a coordination game followed consecutively by a two-step battle-of-the-sexes game. Including an image next to the decision options aims at revealing the effects of context and learning.
It is worth pursuing further interdisciplinary research on the mentioned topics, in particular on the role of derivative and non derivative salience and the possible application of theory-theory and simulation-theory in behavioural games.
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